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CONSUMER LITIGATION FINANCING
IN ILLINOIS: SEEKING SECURITY AND
LEGITIMIZATION THROUGH
REGULATION
Michael J. Howlett ∗

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he Consumer Litigation Financing, also known as Consumer
Litigation Funding, (“CLF”) industry has been the subject of
an increasing number of commentaries and legislative initiatives
across the United States. To date, relatively few jurisdictions
have directly regulated the industry via statute, largely through
industry-backed bills. Additionally, several jurisdictions have
regulated the industry through non-statutory means, including
judicial rulings, voluntary agreements, and consent decrees.
Illinois has previously attempted to regulate the industry on two
occasions. After passing legislation out of the State Senate, the bill
failed in the House in 2010. Last session, several bills failed to
pass the Illinois General Assembly, which would statutorily
recognize and regulate the practice of CLF, but the sponsor has
indicated plans on pushing for passage in the upcoming 2014
legislative session. The bill, while substantively similar to
industry-backed statutory schemes in other jurisdictions, presents
some unique provisions which have not been tested yet in other
jurisdictions. This article will begin with a brief overview of the
industry and the methods of regulation in other jurisdictions.
Further, this article will analyze the unique provisions of the
Illinois legislation, and the pending bill as a whole, in light of the
relevant Illinois case law and the lobbying efforts surrounding the
proposed legislation.
Ultimately, the industry’s push for regulation will in
effect, if not by purposeful design, achieve legitimization and
∗
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protection for the industry from legal challenges. The currentlystalled legislative proposals would provide this legitimization.
However, any of the proposals would also take the important
steps toward protecting consumers of legal services through
general regulatory oversight, capping interest rates, and allowing
for a consumer protection study and a sunset provision to
reevaluate the regulations after sufficient information is
compiled.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRY
The Third-Party Litigation Financing industry has three
general segments: (1) Corporate Litigation Finance, (2) Direct
funding to law firms, and (3) CLF. It is the third of these
segments which merits, and thus far has attracted, the most
judicial and legislative attention. This is primarily for two,
facially apparent, reasons. First, in the other industry segments,
the interests at stake are purely pecuniary as opposed to the
compensation for damages sought in a personal injury case.
Second, the parties seeking the funding in the first two segments
are much more sophisticated actors than most personal injury
plaintiffs. As a result, much of the newly passed regulation has
focused on CLF, leaving the other segments to be regulated by
investment and business-to-business lending statutes.
Generally, there is a dearth of hard data concerning the
CLF industry and the characteristics of funding arrangements.
However, there are a number of sources and facts that help
sketch a rough outline of the industry. First and foremost, it bears
noting that the $100 million industry1 typically advances low
dollar amounts to consumers, generally ranging from $1,750 to
$4,500, 2 or phrased another way, 10% to 20% of the plaintiffs
expected award.3 That being said, several of the cases far
exceeded this amount, with at least one consumer receiving an
advance of $177,500. 4 It is also worth noting that the majority of
funding is used by consumers to cover rent or mortgages during
litigation, with the greatest percentage aimed at preventing
1
Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011.
2
Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States:
Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns, RAND CORPORATION, at 24-25 (2010)
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP306.html.
3
Appelbaum, supra note 1.
4
Lawsuit Fin. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
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foreclosures. 5
While the sums advanced to consumers generally are
small, the interest charged on the advance seems to vary widely,
depending on the case or funding company. The figure that is
most often presented by the industry is 3-5% monthly
compounding interest, 6 which can, in itself, be in excess of 60%
Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”). 7 However, that figure is
exclusive of fees on the advance, and is by no means standard.
One company, LawCash, based out of Brooklyn, New York,
reported their average APR on a funding agreement was 1648%. 8 The American Legal Finance Association–a national
business association representing the CLF industry–admits that
just a few years ago, the typical monthly percentage was 10%. 9
As would be expected, sources that are not connected to
the industry paint a much different picture. A variety of sources
have reported APR’s at 100%, 10 50% of the advanced amount
owed in interest after six months, 11 or even up to 280%. 12 Clearly,
there are at least a few instances of corporate actors charging far
beyond the self-proclaimed industry standard interest rates.
The rationale behind higher rates is the potential risk in
such funding arrangements. Nearly without variation, these
funding arrangements are non-recourse, meaning the CLF
company has no legal recourse to collect either the principal
amount or the interest if the consumer is unsuccessful in their suit
or awarded an amount less than what is owed.13 Facially, this is a
valid argument. The higher the risk the company takes, the

Gail Markels, Third Party Litigation Financing - Public Policy Aspects,
Conference of Western Attorneys General, July 7, 2011.
6
Garber, supra note 2, at 12.
7
Darren McKinney, ATRA Opposes “Third-Party Financing of
Lawsuits”, Press Release, June 14, 2010.
8
Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West
of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L.
55, 73 (2004).
9
American Legal Finance Association, Legal Finance: Myth v. Fact, and
How ALFA is Helping, AMERICAN LEGAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION (May 1,
2013),
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/alfa1/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rTxg4YCm
3vA%3D&tabid=71&mid=553 [hereinafter “Myth v. Fact”].
10
Appelbaum, supra note 1.
11
Id.
12
Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 240.
13
Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Suthers, No: 12CA1130, 2013 WL 2299721, at
*2-4 (Colo. App. Ct. May 23, 2013).
5
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greater their interest rate should be, particularly if they have no
recourse should the consumer’s suit be unsuccessful. However,
far from providing funding for each and every interested
consumer, the companies have a rigorous internal review,
conducted by attorneys employed by CLF companies. 14 The
process is so rigorous that CLF companies have roughly a 70%
rejection rate for funding requests, 15 with some companies having
individual rejection rates of nearly 95%. 16 Further, it is common
industry practice for funding companies to require that the
consumer be represented on a contingency fee basis, 17 adding
another validator in the form of an attorney agreeing to bear the
costs of litigation in expectation of an award or settlement.

III. CRITIQUES OF CONSUMER LITIGATION FINANCE
Just as payday loans and the subprime lending market
before it, CLF incurs its fair share of criticism from consumer
protection advocates. Unlike payday loans and subprime lending,
the industry also attracts criticisms from tort reform advocates.
The consumer protection criticism centers on several aspects of
the CLF industry: namely unduly high interest rates,
transparency issues, and inflated claims of risk.18 Tort reform
advocates criticize the industry for its potential effects on the
quality and length of litigation, settlement amounts, and attorney
client privilege. 19
Far and away, the majority of consumer protection
critiques of CLF focus on the issue of predatory rates. Just as

14
Oasis Legal Finance, The Approval Factors for Funding Personal
Injury
Lawsuits,
OASIS
LEGAL
FINANCE,
(May
1,
2013)
https://www.oasislegal.com/legal_finance_services/lawsuit_funding_approval_
factors [hereinafter “Oasis Approval Factors”.
15
Appelbaum, supra note 1.
16
Lawrence Schaner, Third-Party Litigation Funding in the United
States, REVISIT DE ARBITRAGEM E MEDIACAO Jan.-Mar., 175, 186 (2012).
17
American Legal Finance Association, Frequently Asked Questions,
AMERICAN
LEGAL
FINANCE
ASSOCIATION
(May
1,
2013),
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/faq.asp.
18
See generally McKinney, supra note 7; Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at
590.
19
See generally John Beisner, Jessica Miller & Gary Rubin, Selling
Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third Party Litigation Funding in the United
States, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 5 (Oct. 2009),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/research
/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf.
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with payday loans, the CLF industry is being criticized for
charging extraordinarily high rates, evidenced by interest charges
of up to 280%. 20 Even if the 280% APR is considered to be an
outlier, rates of 100% APR have been consistently reported. 21 In
fact, the CLF industry itself has admitted to historically charging
10% monthly compounding interest, 22 far above statutorily
authorized lending rates for other types of high-risk cash
advances. 23 Further, even though it is true that the industry as a
whole has lowered the monthly percentages charged to
consumers, 2 - 4% monthly compounding interest can often be in
excess of 60% APR, 24 in addition to the charges and fees
companies typically charge. Even these lower rates are nearly
double the statutorily authorized amounts for payday loans,25 and
are certainly higher than credit card and traditional bank lending
rates. 26
In response to claims of predatory lending, the industry’s
typical response is that these higher rates are justified by the level
of risk they assume in lending to consumers who may lose their
case, precluding the company from recovering. 27 While this
argument is logically sound, the claims of risk may be inflated.
Far from funding any risky suit where the plaintiff needs funding
to bring their case, CLF companies generally have a rigorous
vetting process, with in-house lawyers pouring over the case to
determine not only the probability of success, but also a likely
award amount.28
In light of this vetting process, it is unlikely that many of
the funded cases do not yield repayments to the companies. As
such, the argument that the high-risk nature of the loans
necessitates high interests rates, while not theoretically
inaccurate, may not be an accurate representation of the real risks
Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 240.
Appelbaum, supra note 1.; Caitlin Ginely, States Are Battleground in
Drive to Regulate Lawsuit Funding, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
(May 1, 2013), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/02/2160/states-arebattleground-drive-regulate-lawsuit-funding.
22
Myth v. Fact, supra note 9.
23
250 ILL. COMP. STAT. 670/15 (2011); Settlement Agreement and
Consent Order: DFR-EU-2008-241, Md. Dept. of Fin. Reg. (Aug. 6, 2009)
[“Consent Order”].
24
McKinney, supra note 7.
25
205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 670/15 (2012).
26
Garber, supra note 2, at 10.
27
Martin, supra note 8, at 65.
28
Oasis Approval Factors, supra note 14.
20
21
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faced by the industry. 29 Unlike payday lenders, CLF companies
have attorneys vetting consumer’s suits, determining both the
likelihood and potential amount of an award or settlement. 30 As
noted above, this process results in an industry-wide rejection
rate of 70% for funding requests, 31 with individual rejection rates
of nearly 95%. 32 In fact, LawCash reported losing money on only
4% of its cases in a two year period.33 By means of comparison,
payday lenders have a default rate of 10-20%, 34 far above most
CLF companies. This apparent disparity between claims of risk
and rates charged has led one commentator to note: “The realistic
risk of non-recovery [sic] seems very little in comparison to the
interest rate and is therefore unjustifiable in relation to the high
cost of loans to the consumer.” 35
Related to the criticism of high rates, opponents of CLF
are troubled by transparency issues surrounding the industry. In
soliciting potential consumers, the industry generally uses
television advertising, 36 often in the same tenor and tone of
payday lenders 37 and structured settlement and annuity
purchasers.38 While the commercials tout quick access to much
needed cash, conspicuously absent is any information relating to
the interest rates, terms of the lending agreements, or length of
the agreement.
The selective non-disclosure of terms does not end with
advertisements. Former CLF company employees have reported
that they were instructed not to mention rates to consumers

Tanya Taubman, Access to Justice with Protection: Improving
Alternative Litigation Financing with Consumer Protections, paper submitted
to Alternative Litigation Funding: a Roundtable Discussion Among Experts,
at 35 (2012).
30
Appelbaum, supra note 1.
31
Id.
32
Schaner, supra note 16, at 186.
33
Martin, supra note 8, at 73.
34
Megan McArdle, On Poverty, Interest Rates, and Payday Loans, THE
ATLANTIC,
Nov.
18,
2009,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/11/on-poverty-interestrates-and-payday-loans/30431/.
35
Taubman, supra note 29, at 35.
36
Oasis Legal Finance, Lawsuit Funding TV Commercials, OASIS LEGAL
FINANCE, (May 1, 2013), https://www.oasislegal.com/resources/commercials.
37
Cash Net USA, It’s Done With CashNetUSA, CASH NET USA (May 1,
2013), http://www.cashnetusa.com/blog/its-done-with-cashnetusa/.
38
J. G. Wentworth, Commercials, J. G. WENTWORTH, (May 1, 2013),
available at http://www.jgwentworth.com/about/commercials.
29
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unless asked directly. 39 In another instance, a consumer was
quoted a relatively modest APR of 39%, but was later charged
upwards of 76% of the loan amount after the first year. 40
Apparently the practice was so widespread in the state of New
York that then-Attorney General Eliot Spritzer entered into an
agreement requiring a code of conduct and setting base industry
practices for New York CLF companies. 41
The final consumer protection argument against CLF
focuses on the core business model of the industry, specifically
that it is a for-profit business with little to no interest in justice. 42
The gist of the argument is that these companies, like any
investor, are concerned with rates of return, regardless of any
underlying benefits provided or detriments caused to the legal
system. 43 Rather than being concerned with providing access to
the judicial system for those who could not otherwise seek justice
and compensation for injury, the industry is more concerned with
profit. Buford Capital’s CEO Chris Buford’s comments are
illustrative of the view that pervades the industry: “We’re
fundamentally a capital provider. We take a share of the ultimate
recovery, having taken the risk of funding the case. Forget this
being about the law or litigation - we’re providing risk funding
for an investment in the same way as in any other sector of the
market. If the investment pays off we make a return on the
capital we’re investing.” 44 In light of that frank self-assessment of
the industry, it is clear that the argument that the CLF industry is
unconcerned with considerations of justice is not unfounded.
That being said, being unconcerned with justice is not the same
as promoting injustice, and certainly does not preclude the
industry from encouraging justice, even if it is not a primary goal.
While the consumer protection arguments against CLF
Appelbaum, supra note 1.
Id.
41
Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law §63(15) In the
Matter of Plaintiff Support Services, Inc.; Pre-Settlement Finance, LLC;
QuickCash, Inc.; Magnolia Funding, LLC BridgeFunds Limited; Plaintiff
Funding Corporation d/b/a LawCash; Oasis Legal Finance Co., LLC; The
Whitehaven Group, LLC; New Amsterdam Capital Partners LLC d/b/a
LawMax, N.Y. Att’y Gen. (2005).
42
Matt Byrne, World’s Largest Dispute Financier’ Targets US Litigation
Market Uptick, THE LAWYER (May 1, 2013), available at
http://www.thelawyer.com/worlds-largest-dispute-financier-targets-uslitigation-market-uptick/1006248.article.
43
Id.
44
Id.
39
40
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are certainly valid and troubling, most of the criticism in
academia and most of the opponents lobbying against the
industry in state legislatures are focused on tort reform generally.
Instead of opposing the industry because of its impacts on
consumers, the critics and opponents focus on the effects to the
legal system as a whole, particularly any increase in litigation or
awards amounts.
The first and most pervasive tort reform criticism of CLF
is the effect on the quality and quantity of litigation. 45 On its face,
this is a logical argument: the more money given to consumer
initiating actions will increase the overall number of suits and
incentivize consumers with frivolous claims to bring suit by
removing the risk. The argument of increased quantity of
litigation is also straight forward: the basic business model of the
industry is to provide money to consumers who have claims that
are likely to be victorious to pay for expenses during the course of
the litigation. Logically, absent this funding, it is unlikely that the
consumer would be able to bring their suit.
While there is insufficient data on the American CLF
industry to confirm or deny this claim, Australia has seen a 16.5%
increase in litigation following the acceptance of the industry. 46
The largest increases in Australia were in class actions and
insolvency suits, which are not generally funded by the CLF
industry in the United States, and are prohibited in most
statutory schemes regulating the industry.47 However, it should
be noted that this argument is proffered by traditional tort reform
advocates, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
American Tort Reform Association, 48 which represent parties
with little interest in injured parties receiving compensation, as
they typically are the defendants in suits. This argument is
further cast into doubt by the fact that most companies require a
consumer to have legal representation on a contingency fee basis

Garber, supra note 2, at 28-31.
Beisner, supra note 19.
47
Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third Party Funding of American
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 591 (2010); 2013 IL H.B. 531 HA 2 (NS),
2013 Illinois House Bill No. 531 House Amendment 2, Illinois Ninety-Eighth
General Assembly - First Regular Session; 2013 IL H.B. 2301 HCA 1 (NS),
2013 Illinois House Bill No. 2301 House Committee Amendment 1, Illinois
Ninety-Eighth General Assembly - First Regular Session.
48
Sherman Joyce, Comments of ATRA Concerning Alternative Litigation
Financing, ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, March 7, 2011.
45
46
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and to have already filed their suit to obtain funding.49
Directly related to the argument that CLF will increase
the overall volume of litigation is the argument that an increase
in litigation will be caused by frivolous claims being filed as a
form of speculation. Again, as with quantity, the quality
argument appears to be facially sound: the less risk there is to the
party to bring a suit, the more incentivized he will be to bring a
long-shot suit that has the potential for a high award but may not
be meritorious. While this argument is also typically advanced by
the tort reform lobby, 50 it is cast into doubt for much the same
reasons as the quantity argument. The high denial rate of 70% 51
coupled with the contingency fee representation requirement 52
suggests that a frivolous claim would likely not make it through a
CLF company’s internal assessments. Moreover, a frivolous
lawsuit, likely to be thrown out and unlikely to settle, would be a
poor investment and a bad business strategy for the company. 53
Aside from impacts on the litigation process itself, the tort
reform critics of CLF argue the industry negatively impacts
settlements, both in the length of time it takes to settle a case and
because it may force a consumer to forego an otherwise
reasonable settlement offer on account of their obligation to the
CLF company.54 Both of these arguments stem from the same
underlying concern that litigation funding artificially inflates the
value of a claim, dis-incentivizing reasonable settlement amounts,
and prolonging litigation. 55 This force manifests itself in two
ways. First, the funding provided to consumers will likely make
the consumer disinclined to take early settlement offers because
the funding ameliorates their pressing need to settle early—even
if the settlement is fair. 56 Second, and nearly the opposite of the
first, as the litigation continues the consumer may be disincentivized to settle later in the process because of the mounting

Oasis Approval Factors supra note 14; Garber, supra note 2, at 29.
Joyce, supra note 48.
51
Appelbaum, supra note 1.
52
Oasis Approval Factors, supra note 14.
53
Myth v. Fact, supra note 9.
54
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St. 3d 121,
124-25 (2003).
55
Joyce, supra note 48.
56
Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the
Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
503, 522 (2006).
49
50
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interest and fees arising from the funding. 57
This later argument is of particular concern, and was the
basis for the Ohio Supreme Court decision to ban the practice in
2003, 58 though it was later overturned by the Ohio state
legislature. 59 In Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that CLF was prohibited as
champertous in Ohio because it impedes the settlement of the
underlying case. 60 The funding arrangement in the case
effectively barred the consumer from settling for anything less
than $28,000 in order to receive any portion of a settlement. 61
This is before taking into account the consumer’s own internal
settlement amount. This additional deduction, beyond that of a
contingency fee, has the potential to make any reasonable
settlement offer effectively too low, and force the consumer to
push for trial in the hopes of a greater jury award. 62
The final argument advanced by tort reform critics of
CLF is the industry’s effect on attorney client privilege, and to a
lesser degree the effect on the work product doctrine. Generally,
attorney client privilege protects the right to prevent disclosure of
certain information communicated in confidence between an
attorney and his or her client. 63 This privilege is generally waived
if the confidential information is communicated to a third party. 64
The work product doctrine is an extension of this privilege, which
protects documents prepared for litigation or in reasonable
anticipation of litigation. 65 As such, the concern regarding CLF is
that attorney client privilege will be waived when an attorney or
the consumer communicates the particulars of the claim to the
company assessing the claim. 66 While an inadvertent waiver of
Rancman, 99 Ohio St. 3d at 124.
Id.
59
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55 (West).
60
Rancman, 99 Ohio St. 3d at 124.
61
Id.
62
Rancman, 99 Ohio St. 3d at 124.
63
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (9th ed. 2009) (“client’s right to refuse
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications between client and attorney”).
64
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
65
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1746 (9th ed. 2009): “Tangible material or
its intangible equivalent — in unwritten or oral form — that was either
prepared by or for a lawyer or prepared for litigation, either planned or in
progress.”
66
Grace Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product
Doctrine, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1096 (Winter 2012).
57
58
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the privilege is certainly a cause for concern, the risk appears to
be minimal. Most statutes and proposed bills specifically exempt
communications to funding companies from waiving the
privilege. 67 Further, the investment interests of the CLF industry
would be ill-served if in assessing claims the client is placed in a
weaker position waiving the privilege. 68
In assessing the entirety of the arguments against CLF, all
are serious issues with potential harm to consumers and further
burden an already expensive and overused court system. Yet,
most of the above arguments can be ameliorated either by
comprehensive regulation or by taking into account the selfinterest of the industry, with the exception of the high interest
rates and their corresponding effect on settlements. The effects on
settlements cannot be regulated because it rests on the internal
motivations of consumers who need compensation for injuries,
compensation that will be naturally reduced by their obligation to
the funding company. So long as interest rates remain high, the
effect on settlements is likely to remain.

IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CONSUMER LITIGATION
FINANCE
Despite the arguments against CLF, in certain
circumstances, the service provides a measurable social utility by
allowing underprivileged plaintiffs to bring a claim. Arguments
in support of the industry generally center on two points: the
benefits provided to underprivileged consumers, allowing them to
bring claims when they otherwise could not, and internal control
measures and safeguards which protect consumers and limit the
potential negative impacts of the industry. 69
The most compelling argument in support, and the most
difficult to rebut, is the social utility the industry provides.
Regardless of the business motivations of the industry, the fact
remains that their services allow consumers to bring claims for
compensation when they would be otherwise unable. The typical
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55 (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3306.
Letter from Juridica Capital Management Ltd. to ABA Comm’n on
Ethics 20/20, Comments to Issues Paper Concerning Lawyer’s Involvement in
Alt.
Litig.
Fin.,
at
64,
68
(Feb.
2011),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ethics_202
0/comments_on_alternative_litigation_financing_issues_paper.authcheckdam.
pdf.
69
Myth v. Fact, supra note 9.
67
68
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phrase used is “keys to the court house for the poor.” Moreover,
the supporters of the industry argue that the funding advanced to
the consumer is typically a relatively small amount, in the tens of
thousands of dollars.70 Further, these relatively low amounts are
typically sought, and used for legitimate and important financial
obligations. The single largest use of funds is to prevent
foreclosures, with many instances of the funds also being used for
basic living necessities such as food, and not for litigation or
attorney fees. 71
The industry is providing an undeniably positive social
function, truly granting the proverbial keys to the courthouse.
However, the price that accompanies this apparent godsend
cannot be overlooked. Since CLF companies charge an amount
which can take nearly all of the proceeds, the question must be
asked - is the consumer in any better of a position by taking this
funding?
The general industry response to that question is “yes.” 72
The industry contends, and logic would suggest, that financial
assistance to low income consumers early in litigation will
increase their bargaining power, which allows them to withstand
low settlement offers. 73 While this is undoubtedly true, it does not
account for the arguments of exceedingly high rates and such
rates forcing consumers to forego potentially reasonable
settlement offers, opting to go to trial in search of a higher award.
Aside from the social utility provided by the industry, the
other main argument in support of the industry is aimed at
ameliorating the perceived ills of the industry. In response to the
aforementioned criticism, the American Legal Financing
Association and its members have adopted the Best Practices
Code of Conduct. 74 The six point voluntary agreement consists of
the following pledges: (1) obtaining a written acknowledgement
from the consumer’s attorney; (2) the agreement between the
company and the consumer will not constitute ownership of the
claim and the company will not direct or interfere with the
litigation; (3) companies will not advance money in excess of the
Martin, supra note 8, at 73.
Markels, supra note 5; Myth v. Fact, supra note 9, at 1.
72
Markels, supra note 5.
73
Id.
74
American Legal Finance Association, Industry Best Practices - ALFA’s
Code of Conduct, AMERICAN LEGAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION (May 1, 2013),
available
at
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/IndustryBestPractices.asp
[hereinafter “Industry Best Practices”].
70
71
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consumer’s needs; (4) companies will not intentionally overfund
cases; (5) companies will not engage in false advertising or
intentionally mislead a client; and (6) companies will not offer to
or pay commission or referral fees to attorneys for recommending
clients. 75
Certainly all of these provisions are commendable and
have the potential to address the concerns of both consumer and
tort reform advocates alike. However, the Code of Conduct is less
magnanimous than it may appear at first glance. The Code of
Conduct was created immediately after and is heavily based on
an agreement between the industry and the Attorney General
Spitzer of New York. 76 Following a review of the business
practices of several companies in New York, Attorney General
Spitzer entered an agreement with the companies, for which each
company was charged a $5,000 fee for “costs”. 77 The agreement
regulated practices much in the same way as the subsequent code
of conduct; yet, the New York agreement went much further in
regulating the industry, 78 and shares many of the regulatory
provisions in subsequent legislation backed by the industry.79
Moreover, while the Code of Conduct does amend some of the
critics concerns, it is notably silent on permissible interest rates. 80
An additional argument in support of the industry rests on
its internal assessment measures as a control on frivolous
litigation. In assessing this argument, the practices of Oasis Legal
Finance are illustrative of wider industry practices. Oasis funds
cases only after a number of criteria have been satisfied. 81 For
instance, Oasis will only fund personal injury cases where there
were severe injuries, particularly if they resulted in time off
work. 82 Oasis generally does not fund soft tissue injury cases
because of the volatility in assessing awards.83 Additionally, Oasis
assesses the defendant in the case, with “strong liability” often
being determinative, as well as the defendant’s ability to pay
Industry Best Practices, supra note 74.
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41.
77
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41; Industry Best Practices,
supra note 74.
78
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41.
79
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.55; (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3301-3309;
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, §12-101-107.
80
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41.
81
Oasis Approval Factors, supra note 14.
82
Id.
83
Id.
75
76
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damages. 84 As previously noted, Oasis is in line with the industry
practice of requiring consumers to be represented on a
contingency fee basis, ensuring that another party be equally
willing to “assume the risk of winning the case.” 85 Finally, and
perhaps most illustrative, Oasis requires a “sufficient margin for
investment” before agreeing to fund a case. 86 In addressing the
margin of investment, Oasis looks to other liens and expenses that
will be paid out of litigation proceeds. 87 Oasis examines these
liens because CLF obligations are typically the lowest priority
claims on litigation proceeds, as would be the case under several
of the prospective Illinois bills that would regulate the industry. 88
As with the voluntary Code of Conduct, Oasis’s approval
factors address the criticism of tort reform advocates. Yet, it also
serves to undercut the argument that CLF provides access to
underprivileged consumers. It is clear that the overall interest of
the company is a return on its investment, and not the actual
need of the consumer.
In assessing the totality of the arguments for and against
the industry, it is clear that some are more pervasive, and
therefore more critical to address in any regulatory scheme. These
issues are the high interest rates and the corresponding effects on
settlements on the one hand, and the undeniable fact that the
funding, despite its profit driven motives, provides a tangible
benefit to low income consumers seeking to pursue a legal claim
on the other.

V. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEMES
To date, several jurisdictions have taken on the task of
regulating the industry, with the apparent intent of amplifying
the social utility of the CLF industry while accounting for the
accompanying social ills. Jurisdictions that have regulated the
industry have done so in three distinct ways: (1) judicial
oversight, (2) executive agreements and regulation, and (3)
statutory regulation of the industry.
Several jurisdictions have held third party financing of
litigation to be invalid either under champerty or usury.
Champerty is generally defined as “an agreement between a
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra pp. 123, 130.
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stranger to a lawsuit and a litigant, by which the stranger pursues
the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any
judgment proceeds; the act of maintaining, supporting or
promoting another person’s lawsuit.” 89 In one example previously
discussed, the Ohio Supreme Court held that third party finance
of litigation was void as champertous. 90 Nevertheless, several
years after that case decided, the Ohio state legislature
overturned the ruling and passed a regulatory scheme supported
by the industry. 91
Other jurisdictions have had more success in regulating
litigation funding agreements by judicial ruling. In Oklahoma,
the Tenth Circuit prohibited certain third-party funding
agreements as champertous. 92 In Parks v. American Warrior Inc., a
party agreed to pay for a third of the cost of litigation in return
for 40% of the proceeds. 93 The court found the agreement to be
“clearly champertous,” because it was “officious intermeddling in
a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting
the party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.” 94
Perhaps more relevant than third-party funding generally,
several jurisdictions have specifically struck down forms of CLF
as either usurious or champertous. In an example from Michigan,
the state Supreme Court struck down a CLF agreement as
usurious. 95 In Lawsuit Financial, LLC v. Curry, the court held
that non-recourse loans were still loans, regardless of their nonrecourse nature. 96 Because the agreements were found to be loans,
the agreements were held to be usurious, as interest rates of 280%
far exceeded Michigan’s maximum lawful annual interest rate of
seven percent. 97
While non-recourse loans are not generally seen as loans
by most jurisdictions and therefore not subject to usury laws, a
Colorado State Appellate Court ruled in Oasis Legal Finance et.
al. v. Suthers that such financial agreements are loans for the
purposes of regulation.98 In reviewing an appeal of a granted
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009).
See infra pp. 113.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55 (West).
Parks v. Am. Warrior, Inc., 44 F.3d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1995).
Parks, 44 F.3d at 893.
Id.
Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 240.
Id.
Id.
Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC, v. Suthers2013 WL 2299721 at *1 (Colo.
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motion for partial summary judgment de novo, the court affirmed
the district court’s ruling that a non-recourse provision does not
remove a funding agreement from the definition of the term loan
under the state Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”). 99 In
affirming the lower court, the appellate court held that debt,
including contingent debt, falls under the broad definition
previously adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court as aligning
with the UCCC’s underlying purpose of protecting consumers. 100
The court rejected the litigation finance companies’ arguments
that c the loans were non-recourse, on the grounds that the
companies have recourse if the consumers break their contracts for example, if consumer wins and does not or cannot pay the
principle plus interest and fees. 101 As such, while usury was not at
issue in the appellate review of the partial summary judgment, 102
it is entirely foreseeable that when the UCCC is applied in full
force, the agreements could be found to be usurious.
In another such example, a Minnesota court ruled CLF to
be void as champertous, 103 similar to the Ohio Supreme Court
opinion in Rancman. 104 A Minnesota State Appellate Court ruled
in Johnson v. Wright that an agreement contingent upon the
outcome of litigation would be champertous. 105 While the court
held that the agreement at issue was not champertous as it was
not contingent upon the outcome of the case, the court did find
the agreement champertous in assigning a percentage of the
proceeds, and therefore a percentage of the legal claim, to the
lender. 106
While several courts have held that non-recourse funding
agreements are not loans for the purpose of regulation,
jurisdictions are split on the issue. Some courts have held that
the non-recourse nature of these funding agreements renders
them beyond the scope of the relevant jurisdiction’s usury laws.107
App. May 23, 2013).
99
Id. at *10-13.
100
Id. at *10-11.
101
Id. at *15.
102
Id. at *17.
103
Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W. 2d 671, 677 (Minn. App. 2004).
104
See infra pp. 113.
105
Johnson, 682 N.W. 2d at 677.
106
Id.
107
See Dopp v. Yari, 927 F. Supp. 814, 822 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating a
litigation funding agreement is not usurious because it was a joint undertaking
between the parties involved); See also Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding because the profit or interest was
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Though certain jurisdictions have succeeded in generally
protecting consumers and the legal system from champertous
agreements, judicial oversight on this matter is a crude
mechanism. Relying on judicial oversight tends to lead to “all or
nothing” regulation. Recognizing this, several jurisdictions have
taken a different approach - regulating the industry through the
state executive branch. 108 The prime example of this is Maryland,
where the Commissioner of Financial Regulation entered into a
consent order with Oasis Legal Finance in response to licensing
complaints against the company. 109 In response to the complaints,
Maryland issued a cease and desist order to end all of Oasis’s
litigation financing.110 In response to the cease and desist order,
Oasis denied allegations that the agreements were loans or
advances under Maryland law, and therefore subject to the
Maryland usury laws. Nevertheless Oasis agreed to cease
business conduct until Maryland amends the relevant laws. 111 In
addition to having operations ceased in the state, Oasis received a
$105,000 fine. 112
In another aforementioned example, former New York
Attorney General Spitzer entered into an agreement with CLF
companies in 2005.113 In addition to the provisions that led to the
adoption of the ALFA Code of Conduct, 114 the agreement added
additional provisions specifically aimed at consumer
protection. 115 These provisions include: (1) disclosure and
itemization of fees and APR; (2) a five day cancellation policy;
and (3) a natural language provision for those who do not speak
English or Spanish.116 These provisions generally serve as the
basis for legislation in several other jurisdictions. 117
contingent, the transaction cannot constitute usury); See also Anglo-Dutch
Petroleum Int’l, LLC v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Tex. App. 2006).
(indicating a litigation funding agreement where the investor’s return on
investment is contingent on a company’s recovery cannot be usurious).
108
Consent Order, supra note 23; Assurance of Discontinuance, supra
note 41.
109
Consent Order, supra note 23.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41.
114
See infra pp. 116.
115
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41.
116
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41.
117
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.55; (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-33013309; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, §12-101-107.
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To date, the CLF industry has backed successful
legislation recognizing and regulating the industry in three states,
Ohio, Maine, and Nebraska. 118 Generally, the relevant statutes of
these three states are substantively the same, with minor
differences: (1) disclosure of rates, fees and funding amounts; (2)
five day cancellation policies; (3) prohibiting companies from
affecting the outcome of the case; (4) mitigating impacts on
attorney client privileges; (5) prohibiting commissions and
referral fees for lawyers; (6) banning companies from making
decisions with regards to the course of litigation; and (7)
establishing the priority of liens, with the CLF companies’
interest as the lowest priority. 119 Specifically, the statutes capped
the number of months during which fees can be charged at either
36 120 or 42. 121 Notably absent in any of the laws is a cap on the
interests rates and fees to be charged. 122

VI. RELEVANT ILLINOIS STATUTES AND CASE LAW
Illinois has not yet addressed the issue of CLF directly,
and the law is currently in a state of flux. 123 The only case dealing
with the issue in Illinois was a suit over a choice of venue clause
in a funding agreement signed in North Carolina, where the court
held that an agreement entered into in North Carolina could not
be litigated in Cook County. 124 Nevertheless, a look at Illinois
statutes and case law is illustrative in assessing whether CLF
could be successfully challenged, absent the proposed regulatory
scheme supported by the industry and its allies.
The common law and statutory provision most generally
applicable to CLF is maintenance. Maintenance is defined as
“assisting in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit to a litigant by
someone who has no bona fide interest in the case.” 125 Further,
Illinois has a statute specifically prohibiting maintenance, 126 as
Id.
Id.
120
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55; (West); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3305.
121
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, § 12-105.
122
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.55; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-3301-3309; Me.
Rev. Stat. tit. 9-A, §12-101-107.
123
Jennifer Gregory, Payday Loans for Lawsuits? Champerty in Illinois,
CBA RECORD 60, 61 (Oct. 2008).
124
Parson v. Oasis Legal Fin., LLC., 715 S.E.2d 240, 242 (N.C. App. Ct.
2011).
125
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (9th ed. 2009).
126
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32–12 (2009).
118
119
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well as barratry, which is essentially the continuing practice of
maintenance. 127 The statutory prohibition on maintenance has
been interpreted by Illinois courts as the officious intermeddling
in a suit by one who has no interest and is not a party by
maintaining a party, financially or otherwise, with a view toward
promoting litigation.128 Illinois does allow selfless maintenance
when the recipient of the support is either one’s family member
or a person who is impoverished.129
Related to maintenance is the offense of champerty.
Further, Illinois courts have interpreted champerty as an
agreement to pay for litigation in return for part of the proceeds.
In other words, “an essential element necessary to constitute
champerty [is] an agreement to divide the proceeds of
litigation.” 130 While champerty is not specifically recognized by
statute in Illinois, it has not been abolished by statute, surviving
in common law. 131 It should be noted that while champerty does
not apply to contingency fee arrangements in Illinois, direct
lending to a client by a lawyer is still prohibited. 132 In fact, only
the civil-law jurisdiction of Louisiana,133 and a minority of other
jurisdictions including Alabama, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, North Dakota, and Texas permit lawyers to lend to
clients under certain circumstances. 134
The final basis for challenging CLF has been usury laws.
Usury is an excessive rate of interest charged above the legal
amount to the borrower of money. 135 Illinois has regulated
interest rates of similar high risk funding agreements, such as
Consumer Installment Loans (“payday loans”), setting the interest
rate cap at 36% APR. 136 Therefore, any APR above 36% would
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-11 (2009).
Savage v. Seed, 401 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
129
720 ILCS 5/32–12 (2009).
130
Wyman-Gordon Co. v. Lynch Area Fire Prot. Dist. 366 N.E. 2d 1055,
1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
131
Milk Dealers Bottle Exch. v. Schaffer, 224 Ill. App. 411, 415 (1st Dist.
1922).
132
ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, Ethics Ops. 295 (1968).
133
LA ST. BAR ART 16 RPC Rule 1.8.
134
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional
Conduct,
(Sept.
26,
2013,
2:35
PM),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/docs/
ABA_Manual_Financial_Assistance.pdf.
135
Central Life Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Sawiak, 262 Ill. App. 569, 575 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1931).
136
Consumer Installment Loan Act, 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 670/15
127
128
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be considered usurious under the Consumer Installment Loan
Act. While consumers and state officials have had success in
challenging or regulating CLF agreements on the basis of
usury,137 it is unlikely that this would be an effective challenge in
Illinois. This is because under Illinois law, an agreement for
which repayment is based on an uncertain contingency cannot be
usurious. 138 Since CLF is contingent upon the consumer receiving
an award or settlement, it is highly unlikely that CLF could be
successfully challenged on these grounds, as in other such
jurisdictions.139
The state of the law in Illinois regarding these offenses as
applied to third-party litigation funding is by no means settled. 140
The last Illinois Supreme Court case addressing third-party
funding of litigation was decided in 1914.141 In Reiman v.
Morrison, a party had an agreement whereby he would recover
one-half of any interest in stolen property another party received
from pending litigation.142 The Court held that such an agreement
was not void as champerty because the party had not agreed to
bear any of the direct costs of the litigation. 143 In upholding this
agreement, the Court laid out how to successfully challenge an
agreement as champertous: to make a case of champerty, “it must
be shown that the cost and expenses of a suit. . . are paid or
agreed to be paid by one not a party to the suit.” 144
The last Illinois state appellate court opinion addressing
third-party funding of litigation was decided in 1989. 145 In
Puckett v. Empire Stove Co., a landlord assigned their claim to a
tenant to bring suit against a manufacturer of a defective gas
valve, in return for terminating the tenant’s right to contribution
from the landlord.146 The court held that the arrangement was
not champertous since the landlord was not a stranger to the
suit. 147 While upholding this particular arrangement, the court in
Puckett noted: “champerty and maintenance have been
(West 2011).
137
See infra pp. 116-118.
138
Aldrich v. Aldrich, 260 Ill. App. 333, 365-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1931).
139
See supra pp. 120-22.
140
Gregory, supra at note 122.
141
See generally Rieman v. Morrison, 264 Ill. 279 (1914).
142
Id. at 281.
143
Id. at 282.
144
Id. at 286.
145
Puckett v. Empire Stove Co., 539 N.E.2d 420183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
146
Id. at 427.
147
Id.
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disapproved by the courts as public policy because a litigious
person could harass and annoy other.” 148
Finally, the Illinois State Bar Association has previously
issued an opinion on the topic of third-party financing, stating
that it is not unethical for an attorney to assist a client in
obtaining loans related to litigation. 149 However, the opinion was
narrowly tailored to situations where the loan was used to pay
attorney fees, not where lump sums of money were given to
clients to cover basic expenses. 150
In light of the state of the law in Illinois, and the successful
challenges to the funding in other jurisdictions, it is foreseeable
that a consumer could successfully challenge a funding agreement
in an Illinois court. This uncertainty is troubling to the industry,
and is presumably the driving purpose behind their push for
regulation. Generally, CLF companies are averse to having their
funding arrangements go to trial, and they prefer settlements. 151
For instance, the head of a Brooklyn-based CLF company was
quoted as saying, “[e]verything that might have to go before a
judge, you stay away . . . we don’t want judges to shine a light on
us.” 152 This animosity to judicial review seems to be predicated on
the idea that judges perceive a “smell of predatory lending” on the
industry.153 Clearly, the judicial challenges to agreements in
various jurisdictions have incentivized the industry to fund cases
expected to settle before trial.
Yet, even if the industry is successful in keeping their
agreements out of the glare of judicial review, there is still the
risk of state executive officers challenging and regulating the
industry, as occurred in Maryland and New York. 154 The reality
is that if a consumer is successful at trial, his award will be likely
greater than any amount for which he could settle. After finding
success in Nebraska, Maine and especially Ohio by successfully
preempting or even overturning legal challenges to funding, the
stage is set in Illinois for a successful industry push for CLF
Id.
ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, ISBA Advisory Opinion on Professional
Conduct, (Sept. 26, 2013, 4;13 pm), http://www.isba.org/sites/default/
files/ethicsopinions/92-09.pdf.
150
Gregory, supra note 122.
151
Appelbaum, supra note 1.
152
Id.
153
Martin, supra note 8, at 63.
154
Assurance of Discontinuance, supra note 41; Consent Order, supra
note 23.
148
149
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friendly regulation.

VII. PENDING ILLINOIS LEGISLATION
Turning to the previous attempts at statutory recognition
of CLF in Illinois, the failed 2010 attempt, Senate Bill 3322, 155
(“SB 3322”) was substantively similar to the bills passed in other
jurisdictions.156 Additionally, the most recent attempt to regulate
the industry in Illinois, House Bill 2301 (“HB 2301”) as
introduced, was roughly the same proposal as offered in SB
3322. 157 HB 2301 would have created the Non-Recourse Civil
Litigation Funding Act. 158
Unlike other jurisdictions, the opponents of CLF, and
particularly the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and the Institute
for Legal Reform, offered a competing proposal. 159 House Bill
2300 (“HB 2300”) would have regulated CLF as the state
regulates other cash advance arrangements, such as payday
loans, under the Consumer Installment Loan Act. 160 Notably, this
would cap the interest rate of CLF agreements at 36% APR. 161
Additionally, the bill would require disclosure of the agreement to
both the court and the defendant. 162
HB 2300 and HB 2301, as introduced, quickly lost
support, in favor of a succession of compromise amendments to
HB 2301. House Committee Amendment 1 to HB 2301 (“HCA
1”) added additional provisions to those in the previous legislation
and HB 2301: (1) a natural language contract requirement for
non-English speakers; (2) a prohibition on funding for class action
suits; (3) a prohibition on attorneys and law firms having a
financial interest in CLF companies who provide funding for
their clients; (4) a cap on payments to only proceeds from the
pending litigation; (5) a requirement for companies to only receive
an assignment of a contingent right to receive proceeds from a
S.B. 3322, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).
See supra pp. 17.
157
H.B. 2301, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
158
Id.
159
Bethany Krajelis, Thapedi Introduces Legislation on Hourly Billing
Rates, Lawsuit Lending, ILLINOIS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 1, 2013),
http://ilchamber.org/news/8617/thapedi-introduces-legislation-on-hourlybilling-rates-lawsuit-lending/.
160
H.B. 2300, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
161
Consumer Installment Loan Act, 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 670/15
(West 2011).
162
H.B. 2300, supra note 160.
155
156
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claim, and not an assignment of the claim itself, which is not to be
determined as a percentage of the proceeds; (6) an allowance for
companies to fund a consumer who has previously been funded
by another company without purchasing the assignment of the
first company; (7) caps of specific charges to the consumer;
codification of the claim priority of the company; and (8) caps on
the fee assessment at 36 months. 163
While many of these provisions were instituted in various
other jurisdictions, Illinois also proposed a provision that is
wholly unique. HCA 1 proposed a dual lending provision,
providing that consumers seeking litigation funding would have
the option of entering into a non-recourse funding agreement or a
traditional loan regulated under the Consumer Installment Loan
Act (“CILA”). 164 If the CILA option was taken, the APR would be
capped at 36%, as it is for other CILA loans, such as payday
loans. 165 If the non-recourse funding option were taken, the
interest rate would be capped at 36% APR with an additional
monthly 3% deferment fee. 166 Further, it should be noted that the
CILA option would be regulated under CILA, and not generally
under the Act. 167
HB 2301 was subsequently amended by House Committee
Amendment 2 (“HCA 2”), adding: (1) additional disclosure
sections; (2) CLF is assignable and not to be construed as a loan
or investment for the purpose of regulation; (3) licensure
requirements; (4) a data reporting plan to compile a consumer
protection study; and (5) a sunset provision repealing the bill for
re-passage following the culmination of the consumer protection
study. 168 The data collected by this provision would include the
number of transactions, the amount of funding in each
transaction, the number of transactions required to be repaid, the
average annual fee rate, and the total number of transactions
where the company received full repayment, partial repayment
and no repayment. 169 HCA 2 also contains a superiority clause,
meaning that in the event of a conflict between the legislation and
163

H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 1, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill.

2013).
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 2, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill.

2013).
169

H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 2 supra note 168.
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other state laws, this legislation supersedes those other laws. 170
While Oasis continued its support of this proposal and the Illinois
Chamber continued its opposition, the Illinois Trial Lawyers
Association reserved judgment on HCA 2. Perhaps because of
this, HCA 2 to HB 2301 failed to pass out of committee before the
relevant House deadline, and was re-referred to the Rules
Committee pursuant to House Rule 19. 171
That was not the end of the push for regulation during the
98th General Assembly. State Representative Andre Thapedi (D
- 32nd) the sponsor of the previous bills, amended HB 531, a shell
bill which had been passed out of committee earlier in the session
and was on 2nd Reading in the House, with a regulatory scheme
similar to HCA 2. House Amendment 1 (“HA 1”) made several
changes to HB 531. While HA 1 to HB 531 preserved the choiceof-loan provision, it changed the percentages for non-recourse
loans from 36% with a 3% monthly deferment fee to 36% with a
1.5% bimonthly deferment fee. 172 HA 1 to HB 531 also changed
the required disclosures to the consumer, requiring the disclosure
of the total dollar amount owed to the company at 30 day
intervals for 1080 days, after which no fees could be assessed. 173
Additionally, the amendment added that notwithstanding notice
of the non-recourse funding agreement, the consumer’s attorney
is not responsible for paying or ensuring payment of the
obligation.174 As with HCA 2 to HB 2301, the Illinois Trial
Lawyer Association did not officially support HA 1 to HB 531.
An additional amendment was also filed for HB 531. HA
2 to HB 531 offered several changes to HA 1, specifically: (1)
excluding entities that engage in commercial to commercial
business transactions from regulation under the act; (2) requiring
disclosures of the total dollar amount owed at 180 day intervals,
as opposed to 30 days under HA 1, for 1,080 days; (3) shortening
the cancelation window from 10 days to 7 days; (4) deleting the
provision added in HA 1 that notwithstanding notice of the nonrecourse funding agreement, the consumer’s attorney is not
responsible for paying or ensuring payment of the obligation; (5)
deleting the provision prohibiting funding of class action suits;
and (6) adding that nothing in the act shall cause non-recourse
170
171
172

Id.
Rules of the Illinois House of Representatives, Ill. House R. 19(a).
H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill.

2013).
173
174

Id.
H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172.
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lending to be deemed a loan or investment and such agreements
cannot be regulated as such. 175
Additionally, like HA 1, HA 2 to HB 531 preserves the
choice-of-loan provision, but changes the interest rate caps for
non-recourse funding arrangements back to 36% with a 3%
monthly deferment fee from the 1.5% bi-monthly fee in HA 1. 176
Finally, HA 2 would delay the sunset provision and date of
consumer protection study from May 31, 2015 to May 31, 2019. 177
Neither HA 1 nor HA 2 contained the superiority clause
contained in HCA 2 to HB 2301. 178 HA 2 to HB 531 was
supported by the traditional supporters of the industry including
Oasis and several other CLF companies, the Illinois Trial
Lawyers Association, and the American Legal Finance
Association. The opponents to the industry were also largely the
same, but were joined by the Illinois Department of Financial
and Professional Regulation, the department tasked with
regulating the industry under the various bills and amendments.
Despite the rush of amendments to HB 531, it failed to
meet the 3rd Reading deadline and was re-referred to the Rules
Committee pursuant to House Rule 19. 179 As it stands now, HCA
2 to HB 2301 and both HA 1 and 2 for HB 531 are effectively
stalled for the duration of this legislative session, but will be
pending in the Rules Committee in January 2014, following the
veto session. Rep. Thapedi, after accommodating the various
stakeholders in HA 1 to HB 531, still did not expect any of the
stakeholders to fully support HA 1.180 Thapedi recognized that
many of the stakeholders will “equally work against the bill
because they are not getting everything that they want.” 181
Nevertheless, the Thapedi thinks “the bill that’s filed is soup,
and . . . it’s ready to go.” 182 As such, it is entirely foreseeable that
Rep. Thapedi will continue his press for statutory recognition and
regulation of the industry.

H.B. 2301, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 163.
Id
177
Id
178
H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172.
179
Rules of the Illinois House of Representatives, Ill. House R. 19(a).
180
Andrew Maloney, Lawsuit Loans Face Regulation in Illinois General
Assembly, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Apr. 16, 2013.
181
Id.
182
Id.
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VIII. ANALYSIS OF THE BILLS
In assessing the competing provisions offered during the
legislative session, it is worth noting the various pieces of
legislation were largely industry bills. Oasis has been the
strongest and most vocal supporter of the House proposals,
supported in their efforts by the American Legal Finance
Association. This is further evidenced by the overwhelming
similarity between the initially proposed HB 2301 and legislation
passed in other jurisdictions. Obviously, there are certain
provisions contained in the various proposals that are not part of
the industry’s ideal bill. Nonetheless, the substance of the bill will
still accomplish the goal of legitimizing the industry through
statutory recognition. That the industry wants to ensure the
practice remains legal in Illinois should go without saying; Cook
County is one of the largest unified court systems in the world. 183
The industry would certainly be willing to go to great lengths to
ensure its continued operation in such a large market.
Perhaps most notable about the lobbying efforts behind
the bill was the shifting stance of the Illinois Trial Lawyers’
Association (“ITLA”). Traditionally a strong voice in the state
capitol, ITLA supported several versions of the legislation but
not all. The combined weight of their lobbying strength when
added to that of the CLF industry could prove to be the decisive
factor in passing a regulatory scheme in 2014.
It is also worth noting that the opponents of the bill are
generally the tort reform advocates that have opposed the
industry’s lobbying efforts elsewhere. The Illinois Chamber of
Commerce and the Institute for Legal Reform, a wing of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, were the lead opponents of the measures
in Illinois. While their opposition may be tangentially related to
consumer protection, the Chambers’ main interest is in limiting
litigation since its members are often the defendants, mimicking
the U.S. Chamber’s opposition.184 As such, this seems to be a
compromise bill in a true sense of the term, in that the tort reform
advocates achieved victories with the inclusion of the sunset
provision, ban on referral fees, and interest rate caps on an other-

183

http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OfficeoftheChiefJudg
e.aspx (Last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
184
See infra p. 111.
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wise industry supported bill.185
To the substance of the bills, as stated above, any of the
pending amendments, if passed, would accomplish the industry’s
goal of statutory recognition and regulation of the industry. This
seems to be of the utmost importance to the industry, as it would
circumvent the harsh judicial review process imposed by other
jurisdictions.186 As previously noted, members of the industry see
judicial oversight as the worst possible form of scrutiny and
regulation to which the industry could be subjected. 187 There is
no greater example of this process than Ohio, where the industry
engaged in an extensive lobbying effort to overturn the State
Supreme Court’s decision to strike down all CLF
arrangements. 188
The industry’s fear of judicial review and oversight
striking down funding arrangements would likely be completely
amended should the pending legislation be passed. Taking
champerty first, it is almost certain that any claim would be
unsuccessful should any of the pending proposals be passed.
Since champerty only survives at common law in Illinois, 189 any
legislative enactment would supersede the claim, unless the
legislation were struck down as unconstitutional.
The impact on usury challenges would be much the same.
Aside from the fact that usury has been found not to apply to
non-recourse loans in Illinois, 190 even the CILA loans authorized
under provisions would not be seen as usurious since any loan
would be capped at 36% APR. 191 Any funding agreement
charging less than that rate would not be usurious by definition.
It is unclear how statutory prohibition on maintenance
would be interpreted in light of the pending proposals. The
picture is most clear for HCA 2 to HB 2301, which includes a
superiority clause.192 This clause, were it to be enacted, would
effectively protect the industry from any challenge based on
Non-recourse Civil Litigation Advances, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§1349.55 (West 2013); Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, Neb. Rev. Stat § 253304 (West 2012); Maine Consumer Credit Code, Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 9-A, §12105 (2013).
186
See infra pp. 119-22.
187
See infra pp. 128.
188
See infra pp. 111.
189
See infra pp. 125-26.
190
Aldrich, 260 Ill. App. at 365-66.
191
H.R. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172.
192
H.R. 2301, Comm. Amend. 2, supra note 168.
185
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maintenance. It is unclear, though unlikely, whether a challenge
based on maintenance would be successful should either HA 1 or
HA 2 to HB 531 pass since they lack a superiority clause. 193
In comparing the unique provisions of the Illinois
proposals to regulatory schemes in other jurisdictions, the
provision that is the furthest departure from other jurisdictions is
the choice-of-loan mechanism. No other jurisdiction that has
regulated CLF has authorized a recourse loan agreement. 194 In
theory, this is fundamentally divergent from other schemes. In
practice, it is likely that this will operate as if the consumer
sought a payday loan instead of litigation financing to support
themselves during the initial stages of litigation. While the
relative evils of payday loans may be argued, it remains that such
cash advances are legal and regulated in Illinois. 195 Moreover, it is
likely that this provision was included to allow currently
operating CLF companies to continue operations during the three
month period allowed for the Illinois Department of Financial
and Professional Regulation to go through the rule-making and
licensure process.
The Illinois proposals also differ from other statutory
regulations of the industry by prospectively implementing a cap
on interest rates. Alternatively capped at 36% with a 3% monthly
deferment fee 196 and 36% with a 1.5% bi-monthly deferment
fee, 197 the bills, if passed, would cap the allowable interest rates at
roughly 72% APR plus the deferment fees. While this is certainly
high, much higher than most loans, it is worth noting that this
would be a ceiling. The loan would still not have to be paid back
if the consumer’s claim was unsuccessful, and competition would
likely drive the interest rates lower in most instances. This is
certainly extraordinarily high at first blush, and, in light of the
choice-of-loan provision, may drive consumers to opt for the
traditional CILA loan, with little consideration of the recourse
nature of such a funding agreement.
H.R. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172.
Non-recourse Civil Litigation Advances, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§1349.55 (West 2013); Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, Neb. Rev. Stat § 253304 (West 2012); Maine Consumer Credit Code, Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 9-A, §12105 (2013).
195
Consumer Installment Loan Act, 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 670/15
(West 2011).
196
H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 1, supra note 172.
197
H.B. 531, Comm. Amend. 2, 98th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2013).
193
194
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While the choice-of-loan and rate cap provisions are
important steps and are sure to meet resistance from both
proponents and opponents of the industry, the most important
provisions in the bill are the data reporting, consumer protection
study, and sunset provision. The single biggest hurdle in assessing
and regulating the industry to date has been the lack of data
regarding the particulars of the industry. On each side of the
debate parties generally rely on anecdotal evidence. While it is
true that many of the companies use hard data to support their
arguments, it is generally limited and unverifiable, as it comes
from internal records. Regardless of which bill ultimately passes,
by requiring all CLF companies to report hard data on their
funding agreements, the consumer protection study that would be
submitted to the General Assembly on the eve of the sunset
provision will provide vital data necessary in evaluating the
effectiveness of the regulatory program.
The previously unregulated nature of this industry means
that it is highly unlikely that any regulatory package will be
perfect. The sunset provision allows the critics of the legislation
an opportunity to seek further regulation in two to five years,
depending on which amendment is ultimately adopted and
passed. Further, it gives the industry an opportunity to prove its
merits, and achieve the legitimization it is seeking.

IX. CONCLUSION
CLF is a hotly contested issue in law review articles, and
in court rooms and state legislatures across the country. It is in
the latter that the proponents and opponents have debated the
issue in Illinois. After a half dozen proposals, and several
parliamentary maneuvers, the issue has stalled for the 2013
legislative session, waiting in committee for the 2014 legislative
session.
Merely because the industry is supporting such regulation
does not mean that the regulations are per se weak or inadequate.
A cursory glance shows that the regulations proposed will serve a
workable canvas for additional provisions to be added, either
during the legislation process or on the re-passage of the
legislation following the sunset provision. Even without
accounting for amending the proposal, the provisions common to
the various proposals - interest rate caps, bans on referral fees,
natural language provision, cancellation policy, disclosure of
terms and fees, and priority of claims - all address vital concerns
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of both the tort reform lobby and consumer protection advocates.
The choice-of-loan provision will certainly cause some
regulatory issues and the interest rate caps on the non-recourse
loans have a high sticker price, making the recourse loan an
attractive option. But such issues will arise when attempting to
regulate any industry which was pervasively unregulated. That is
why the most important provision in the any of the pending bills
will likely be the consumer protection study and sunset provision.
CLF certainly has it is unsavory aspects, but it does serve
a social good, and the pending legislation is a good starting point,
contingent of course upon the results of the proposed consumer
protection study.

